Hermes,

> Since we can’t be sure that an animal is conscious, we cannot be sure that it experiences pain. The may have nociception, which is different. Even plants and bacteria have nociception. <

As a biologist, I’m aware of the distinction. It isn’t a matter of being sure, it is a matter of likelihood. Besides, one could make the argument that in ethical cases like this one one should adopt the precautionary principle: if there is a decent chance that your dog is conscious and can feel pain, don’t beat him!

> if you are a true skeptic, you’ll have to recognize that you can never be sure of that, because you cannot experience what goes on in an animal mind. <

That is not what Skepticism means, certainly not the kind I have tried to defend. Skepticism is about inquiry, not disbelief. Indeed, the sort of Cicero-inspired Skepticism I’ve been talking about emphasizes probabilities, not truth or certainty.

> I am not a Skinner-like behaviorist. I think that animal have mental states, and that we can study them. But from that to saying that they are conscious, it’s a big step. <

Is it, though? Evolutionarily speaking, for instance, you think that species of social primates, closely allied to ours, and with big brains, are likely not to be conscious? Do you really believe that when you hit your dog and he yelps this is just a mechanical reflex without anything going on inside?

I’m not a behaviorist either, but sometimes behavior is a pretty darn good guide. You are hitting on the perennial philosophical problem of other minds. On your logic, I can’t be absolutely sure that you are conscious either. You could be a zombie, for all I know.

The real question is where do we draw the line. I think mammals and likely birds are on our same side of it. Reptiles? Don’t know. Fish? There have been debates about it. Invertebrates? Probably mostly no, and yet, see this fascinating book on octopi by my colleague Peter Godfrey-Smith. He makes a good case: https://bookshop.org/a/80309/9780374537197

> we have also discovered that nociceptive circuits are different in rodents and human, with the midbrain playing an important role in rodents and the cortex taking over in humans. <

And that’s certainly interesting. However, it doesn’t mean that rodents don’t feel pain in a way similar to humans. Evolution gives us plenty of examples of how the same outcome can be achieved by way of different biological pathways.

> Equating pain with suffering is also a conceptual mistake. You can have pain without suffering (e.g. masochism) and suffering without pain (e.g. existential angst). <

Thanks for the link, but, again, I’m aware of the distinction, which is often brought up in philosophical discussions. But we are not here talking about masochism or existential angst, we are talking about straightforward physical pain caused by mistreatment of animals. Nobody is arguing that octopi suffer from existential angst, though I wouldn’t be so sure about some of our close primate friends, for instance when they are exposed to the death of loved ones.

> it does sound like you are citing Bentham as evidence that animals suffer. <

No, Bentham’s quote is prescriptive, not descriptive. It doesn’t provide empirical evidence of anything. It should be more properly read as: IF it turns out that animal species X is capable of suffering pain THEN it ethically follows that we should not cause pain to species X.

One could dispute this on ethical grounds, but not on empirical ones. The empirical dimension is informative to the IF … THEN clause, it doesn’t determine it.

> That is precisely the biggest problem with Skepticism. There are almost no skeptics who do not practice selective skepticism. Everyone has his sacred cows. <

Again, this isn’t what Skepticism is about. It’s not a cultivation of disbelief, it’s a cultivation of open inquiry.