Hermes,

> We are not talking about beating a dog. Of course that’s unethical <

Why? Only if the dog feels pain, right?

> What we are talking about is cases in which we have to choose between human suffering and (possible) animal suffering. <

Honestly, this is the first I hear about it. I didn’t know that’s what we were talking about. But let’s.

> Animal liberationists like Peter Singer or Jamie Woodhouse want us to stop biomedical research with animals altogether. This will result in considerable human suffering. … Where do you stand? With science or with animal rights? <

I don’t think it’s a simple dichotomy. I agree with you that, because human suffering is more complex than the animal counterparts, it is ethically more relevant.

That said, there are plenty of things we don’t need to do to animals that would reduce suffering in the world. Like raise them in horrible conditions for the purposes of eating them. Or use them in research on cosmetics.

When it comes to biomedical research, I’m okay with it. So long as the numbers are reduced to a minimum and there is a documented absolute necessity of using animal models. Which is not always the case.

> when you make categorical statements like this “We should value and respect all sentient life because sentience makes it possible for a living organism to suffer”, I see little spirit of inquiry. <

Perhaps because in this case you are not inclined to read my words charitably. I stand by that statement and don’t see a contradiction between it and a limited use of animals in biomedical research. Value and respect are never absolute. Not even for human life.

> It is not the same as ‘the problem of other minds’, because we have a lot of evidence that other humans are conscious that does not apply to animals. <

We also have a lot of evidence that some animals are conscious, so it does apply. Though I understand your distinction.

> Consciousness developed gradually during evolution, so it is likely that animals evolutionarily closed to us have some kind of consciousness. However, this means that consciousness is not all-or-nothing; it exist in degrees, it has parts. <

Correct. As I said before, I’m an evolutionary biologist. I’m on board with this.

> Pain is neither necessary nor sufficient for suffering, so the two should not be confused. <

No modern philosopher does. You are referring to Bentham’s quote, and he was using the word “suffering” in the colloquial sense, as in “my dog is suffering from the pain of the operation.” There is no implication of higher cognition, long-term projects, etc., involved.