Member-only story
Good thinking
Rationality is instrumental, and that’s a problem
The subtle and complex relationship between logic, philosophy, and science
Today I read a decidedly unfavorable review of the latest book by Steven Pinker, Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters. I’m no fan of Pinker, but this article isn’t (mostly) about him or the book. Rather, it’s about one of the main criticisms brought up in the review, written by Ted McCormick for Slate magazine.
Pinker wants to argue that if only people acted rationally then this would be a much better world. But he — correctly — defines rationality as an instrumental quality: “[rationality] is a kit of cognitive tools that can attain particular goals in particular worlds.”
This means, as McCormick shrewdly points out, that Pinker’s project is self-undermining. If rationality is instrumental — and, again, it is — then what is and is not rational depends not just on good reasoning, but on the agent’s goals, values, and assumptions.
For instance, are creationists irrational, or at the very least, do they hold to irrational beliefs? This is a common charge advanced by skeptics such as myself (and Pinker). But consider the following, from the point of view of a typical creationist.
