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Which virtue? Prudence vs Temperance
The ancient Greco-Roman tradition recognizes four principal, or cardinal virtues: practical wisdom (also known as prudence), courage (or fortitude), justice, and temperance (but see this article by Matthew Sharpe for a list of the sub-virtues falling under each of the big four). These are mentioned by Plato in the Republic (IV, 426–435), and there is some tantalizing empirical evidence that they are near-universal among human cultures.
Some Hellenistic schools, like Stoicism, subscribed to the doctrine of the unity of virtues, according to which the cardinal four are different yet deeply intertwined aspects of a single underlying virtue: wisdom. But two of the major philosophers that inspired Hellenism, Socrates and Plato, disagreed on which of two of the four was most fundamental: prudence or temperance.
Let’s take a look beginning with prudence, or practical wisdom, which in Greek is referred to as phronesis. The word indicates good judgment and excellence of character. The modern English “prudence” doesn’t really do justice to the concept, and Thomas McEvilley, in his The Shape of Ancient Thought suggests that a better translation may be “mindfulness.” If only that word weren’t already used to refer to an increasingly amorphous set of practices with more than a hint of mysticism.
In some Platonic dialogues, Socrates suggests that phronesis is most important because it is a necessary condition for the other virtues. Indeed, in the Meno, Socrates says that phronesis is synonymous with moral understanding, although he goes on to argue that it cannot be taught. The only way to learn it is to engage in a quest for self-knowledge, following the Delphic commandment to “know thyself.”
That said, in another dialogue, the Protagoras, Socrates seems to change his mind in response to that Sophist’s arguments and agrees that virtue in general (and, by implication, phronesis in particular) can, in fact, be taught. early on in the exchange Protagoras claims that Sophists can make people into better citizens by teaching them virtue. Socrates responds that while this would be very nice, it cannot actually be done, because virtue is not a skill like, say, medicine or architecture, which can both be learned by associating with someone who is good at them.
